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Abstract
We study soft budget constraints from the perspective of political
economics. A partly partisan government confronts a budget crisis
in a politically important sector, e.g. like the health care sector. To
what extent the government wants to make additional grants to the
sector depends on economic conditions and on the preferences of the
government, both unknown to the electorate. Thus, the government’s
budget response gives a signal of its preferences, and may thereby
in‡uence the probability that the government is re-elected. As a result,
the handeling of a budget crisis becomes ine¢cient even from an ex
post point of view, in the sense that it does not react adequately to
changing economic conditions.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The presence of soft budget constraints is often held as an important obstacle
to e¢ciency within the public sector. If for example a hospital or a state-
owned railway company runs into economic problems due to higher costs than
initially assumed, the level of activity may be maintained due to additional
transfers approved by the politicians. One may argue that the government
(or the tax payers) are best suited for carrying the risk of cost overruns,
and that the patients or the commuters should be fully insured. However,
the risk of cost overruns is not exogenous. Decisions made by the hospital
management are important for the probability of running into de…cits during
a budgetary period. If higher costs do not hurt the hospital or the patients,
1the incentives to produce the services cost e¢ciently are weakened. This is
by now well-known, and many governmental reports touching upon the issue
of public sector e¢ciency very often end up recommending harder budget
constraints.
But why is the budget soft in the …rst place? The most common expla-
nation views soft budget constraints as an endogenous problem arising from
the time-inconsistency problem. Despite the fact that a commitment not to
deviate from the original contract may be preferable ex ante, politicians may
nevertheless …nd it in their own interest to make additional grants when a
de…cit shows up ex post. The bene…t of …nancial assistance exceeds the costs
of down-sizing production - or more dramatically, closing down. For instance,
if part of the costs leading up to a de…cit are sunk, these costs are irrelevant
from a public interest point of view when the politicians look at the case with
fresh eyes. The relevant question is then whether the bene…t of continuation
exceeds the requested increase in the budget. In this case, budgets are soft
because benevolent politicians are not able to abstain from choosing e¢cient
solutions for the economy ex post. See Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and
Qian and Roland (1998) for analysis along these lines. In Dewatripont and
Maskin’s paper the bail-out policy is carried out by pro…t-maximizing banks.
T h e s eb a n k sm a yh a v ea ni n c e n t i v et oh e l pa… r mex post by making further
infusion of capital. Anticipating this, …rms may undertake bad projects ex
ante. In Qian and Roland’ paper, …rms are instead bailed out by the gov-
ernment. The degree soft budget constraints depends on the opportunity
costs of governmental funds. As decentralization of government makes these
costs increase, federalism serves as a commitment device for harder budget
constraints.
In this paper, we study soft budget constraints from a di¤erent perspec-
t i v e . E v e ni fp o l i t i c i a n sf o rs o m er e a s o nw e r ea b l et oo v e r c o m et h et i m e -
inconsistency problem, the political system with elections may not give them
incentives to do so. As pointed out by Kornai (1986), one reason for having
soft budgets are that the government seeks political support. When politi-
cians are acting, for instance by making up a de…cit in the health care sector,
the electorate will update their beliefs about the politicians political stand on
health care issues more generally, and this in turn may in‡uence the probabil-
ity of re-election. Facing …nancial problems in hospitals, there is, potentially,
a con‡ict between the degree of hard budgets and patients’ welfare. If high
costs are not pure slack that might be reduced without reducing the level of
activity, it seems impossible to stay tough without at the same time hurting
2the patients.
If the electorate had the true information about the trade-o¤ between the
degree of softness and patient welfare, the political budget decision would be
informative with regard to political preferences. For example, by choosing a
hard budget ex post, politicians send a message that this particular sector is
not high on the political agenda. More realistically, however, is a situation in
which the electorate is not fully informed about the trade-o¤. The electorate
does not know to what extent a hard budget will hurt the patients. Therefore,
observing a tough government sticking to the original budget, the electorate
does not know whether this is due to economic factors (i.e. a weak trade-o¤)
or due to political factors (i.e. the sector is not given priority by the political
party).
Let us give some examples. In 1997 the Norwegian government intro-
duced prospective payment contracts. According to these contracts, around
50 percent of county-owned hospitals’ income is now determined by …xed pay-
ments based on the diagnosis-related groups (DRG-prices). However, within
this new regime hospitals have recently generated large de…cits, and, con-
sequently, the government had to handle requests for more money. If the
government is tough in such a situation, this may be interpreted as a signal
that the government does not give high priority to the health care sector.
The literature on soft budget constraints following Kornai (1980,1986)
is more concerned with bail-out policies (by banks or governments) towards
enterprises. In our political economy framework, a refusal to bail out a large
state-owned enterprise may signal that the government does not care about
unemployment.
Governmental signalling may cause soft budget constraints in the private
sector as well. Companies in important sectors are often thought to be
operating under an implicit too big-to-fail protection. The wave of banking
crises in the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, showed us that large banks
were bailed out, whereas smaller banks often were allowed to fail. Although
imperfections in the credit market may explain why rescue operations in the
banking sector might be socially e¢cient ex post, another candidate is the
political costs of allowing banks to fail. Even though most depositors are
insured against losses, the industry receiving loans or credit lines may be
hurt by a bank failure. An extensive capital injection by the government,
therefore, may signal a pro-industry attitude by the government. Knowing
that the electorate interprets the handling of de…cits in key sectors as signals
about political preferences, politicians are ”forced into” a strategic bail-out
3policy. The politicians’ concern about re-election guides the message they
should send to the electorate, and this in turn guides their preferred bail-out
policy.
As in the time-inconsistency explanation, budgets are possibly soft due
to the existence of ex post bene…cial moves by the government. The source
of bene…t is di¤erent, though. In our model, the bene…t stems from the
prospect of election success, and not from the possibility of making socially
e¢cient moves. In fact, one of the main results is that the ex post policy by
the government, may by itself be costly, and, therefore, add to the ex ante
costs of lack of commitment power. The budget policy may become in‡exible
in the sense that the size of extraordinary transfers reacts inadequately to
changes in the ex post trade-o¤ between hard budgets and consumer welfare.
Political signalling is not new within political economy. Cukierman and
Tommasi (1998) analyze the incentives of governments of di¤erent political
color in a relatively general setting. In their model, parties have private
information about their preferences (and economic fundamentals), and the
incumbent party distorts its policy in order to conceal its true type. In
Harrington (1993), the voters know the parties’ preferences, but they are
uncertain about the parties’ beliefs about how the economy works. Schultz
(1996) analyzes how parties may have an incentive to misrepresent the cost
of providing public services. In his model, voters know the parties’ valuation
of a public good, but not the costs of providing the good. Before the election,
each party announces policies (the level of the public good). In a pooling
equilibrium, the parties announced policy does not vary with the costs of
production. In his model, announced policy by the winning party is always
implemented after election. In Swank (1998), an incumbent party signals the
cost of providing the public good by its actual policy prior to the election.
With a similar set up to that of our paper, Dalen et al. (2000) study public
ownerships as a signalling device.
2 Political signalling
In this section we develop the main features of a two-period political econ-
omy model of soft budget constraints. In the …rst period, the government
experiences a budget de…cit in a public sector. For the purpose of illustra-
tion, this could be the de…cit of the hospitals in the middle of a budgetary
period. The model seeks to explain the behavior of the government ex post,
4whereas the size of the budget de…cit are kept exogenous.
From an ex post point of view, the government’s non-strategic response to
such a de…cit would both depend on the …nancial costs of making additional
transfers and the welfare e¤ect for the patients (due to a reduced quality
of services or a reduced number of treatments by the hospital). However,
since their actual decision in the …rst period in‡uences the probability of
winning the next election, the government may have an incentive to behave
strategically. If the government is re-elected, it is given the opportunity to
implement their preferred policy for the sector and enjoy the intrinsic value
of staying in o¢ce.
Following Harrington (1993), Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), and Swank
(1998), the electorate is not fully informed about the economic consequences
of sticking to a …xed budget ex post. As pointed out by Cukierman and Tom-
masi, the government deals with the problem on a daily basis, it has access to
the advises of both their own and independent experts, and, of course, they
receive information from those experiencing a de…cit. We also assume that
the government’s political preferences are not fully known by the electorate.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The government confronts a budget de…cit and observes the trade-o¤
between the cost of spending more money and the costs of reduced
activity.
2 .T h eg o v e r n m e n tc h o o s e st h es i z eo fa d d i t i o n a lt r a n s f e r s .
3. The electorate observes both the de…cit and the size of additional trans-
fers approved by the government, and updates its beliefs about the
government’s preferences.
4. An election is held.
5. If the government is re-elected, it implements its preferred policy in the
same sector, and the game ends.
Since the game ends afterwards, the elected government will implement its
…rst best policy for the sector that recently experienced a budget crises. We
assume that the incumbent party’s preferences, if re-elected, do not change af-
ter the election. Thus, the electorate may learn about the incumbent party’s
preferences by observing its handling of a budget de…cit. Still, the observed
5rescue operation is at best a noisy signal of political preferences since the elec-
torate does not know the actual ex post costs of a hard budget constraint.
We assume that the governing party is a partisan government, with pref-
erences over policy outcomes.1 The government’s objective function consists
of two parts: The …rst-period outcome of the budget crisis, and the second-
period policy outcome after the election.
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D denotes the budget de…cit (which is exogenous). Everything else
being equal, the government would prefer to make additional transfers, ¢B,
of size D(1
2 + e + g). The parameter g re‡ects the trade-o¤ between the
cost of spending more tax money and the cost of reducing the activity in
the sector ex post. A low value of g m e a n st h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et os t i c kt o
a rather tight budget constraint without creating too many problems (e.g.
for the patients). This may be the case if part of the problems are due to
ine¢cient management2 Contrary, a high value of g means that a hard budget
constraint will a¤ect the patients harder ex post. A crucial assumption is that
the government is privately informed about this trade-o¤. We assume that
the trade-o¤ parameter is either ¡1
4 (low ex post costs of a hard budget
constraint), 0 (intermediate costs), or 1
4 (high costs). We assume that the








e captures the part of the preferences of the government that is unknown
to the electorate. In our hospital example, a low value of e would re‡ect a
political party that gives less weight to the service provided by the health
care sector. A high value of e re‡ects the opposite. Parties give either
strong (e = 1
4), intermediate (e =0 ), or low (e = ¡1
4) priority to the sector
experiencing a budget crisis.
1For an overview of politcal economy and the preferences of government, see Tabellini
and Persson (2000).
2In the case of the Norwegian hospitals, the government, in fact, responds by saying
that part of the budget problem should be solved by increasing cost e¢ciency.
6For the sake of simplicity ¢B; is assumed to be a discrete choice variable







. Later on, these values will be
referred to as a hard, moderately hard, medium, moderately soft and soft
budget constraint, respectively.
If re-elected, the government chooses how much money it will spend on
the health care sector in the future. A crucial assumption is the transition
of preferences over time. If the government choose to make up the de…cit
because health care is high on the political agenda for the government, the
health care sector will turn up as a ”winning sector” in the next budget
proposed by the government. At reduced-form, the optimal policy in the
second period, if re-elected, follows from preferences:
W2 = ¡[B ¡ B
¤(1 + e)]
2 ; (2)
where B is the government’s spending on this sector for the next period.
It follows that the government prefers to set B = B¤(1 + e) in period 2.
Denoting the probability of re-election by p, the reduced-form intertemporal














In addition to implementing the policy B¤(1+e), the government obtains
a utility ­ of staying in o¢ce. Note that the incumbent has no preferences
over what policy the opposition will implement if there is a change of gov-
ernment. The assumption simpli…es the algebra, and is rationalized by the
fact that parties after an electoral defeat often reorganize and change their
political platform (and thus preferences) anyway.
Let us then turn to the electorate. We assume that the voters’ preferences
are of the same structure as that of the political parties. Thus, each voter has
a preferred policy Bi showing his preferred public spending on this sector.
The voters view on the handling of the budget de…cit does not matter in this
model, since this is ”history” at the time of election. We assume that there
are two parties only, and since political preferences are one-dimensional and
single-peaked it follows that the median voter theorem holds. We denote the
median voter’s preferences by Bm. I no r d e rt oa v o i dt o os t r o n gr e s u l t sw e
7introduce probabilistic voting, which means that the politicians do not know
exactly the preferences of the median voter (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini
(2000)). We formalize this by assuming that the median voter’s preferences
are drawn from a uniform distribution [B¤(1 ¡ c);B¤(1 + c)],w h e r ec>1.
The electorate has no information about the opposition’s preferences,
a n dt h u sa s s u m e st h a ti ti se q u a lt oB¤. The reason is that actual pol-
icy is assumed to be the only way of communicating with the voters. An
announcement of a policy would su¤er from lack of credibility.
If the electorate, after observing ¢B, draws the conclusion that the in-
cumbent’s bliss point is expected to be B0, the incumbent is preferred by










It follows that the incumbent’s probability of winning is maximized if the
electorate believes that the government’s bliss point is equal to the expected
bliss point of the median voter.
3 Equilibria
In this section we characterize equilibria of the model. The game is a se-
quential game of incomplete information. Since the government moves …rst
and has private information, this is a signalling game. A perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the game consists of a strategy for the government, a strategy
for the median voter, and beliefs about the incumbent party’s preferences for
the voter which satisfy three properties. (i) Beliefs are consistent with the
government’s strategy and the priors. (ii) The voter’s strategy (at the elec-
tion) is optimal given these beliefs. (iii) The government’s strategy (handling
of the budget de…cit) is optimal given the voter’s strategy and beliefs.
3.1 A non-responsive budget constraint
There are two important forces a¤ecting the preferred policy by the govern-
ment in period one. First of all, given political preferences and type of budget
3Here we assume that the voters’ loss function (i.e. loss from deviation from preferred
policy) is linear.
8de…cit, the government has its own preferred solution for the budget de…cit.
However, following this solution may be in con‡ict with the bene…t of con-
cealing political preferences. The best election strategy will be to convince
the electorate that your party is in the ”middle of the road”. What type
of response the government gives to a budget de…cit, will depend on which
of these two forces dominates. A non-responsive budget constraint refers
to a situation in which the government adopts the same bail-out policy no
matter what is their political preferences and ex post costs of a hard budget
constraint.
Relying on reasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs as proposed by the intu-
itive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987), such a pooling equilibrium in which
a budget de…cit always provokes an extraordinary transfer of medium size
may exist:




responds by a medium sized transfer, ¢B = D
2 ; no matter what is the ex post
costs of a hard budget constraint.
Proof. See appendix.
The equilibrium response does not provide any new information about
the government’s preferences. Hence, the electorate does not update beliefs
when observing ¢B = D
2 : Crucially, however, is the electorate’s response to
an out-of-equilibrium move by the government. The following set of out-of-
equilibrium beliefs follows from the use of the intuitive criterion:
1. Suppose the incumbent party chooses a soft budget strategy ex post
(¢B = D). Then the electorate updates its beliefs about the prefer-
ences of the incumbent party, and believes with certainty that it gives
high priority to the sector (e = 1
4).
2. Symmetrically, if the incumbent party chooses a hard budget strategy
ex post (¢B =0 ), the electorate believes with certainty that the gov-
ernment will give low priority to the sector during the next term of
election (e = ¡1
4).
3. If the policy chosen is moderately soft (¢B = 3
4D), the electorate
believes with certainty that the government will not give low priority
to the sector in the future. However, whether the government is neutral
or pro-sector is viewed as equally likely by the electorate.
94. Finally, if the policy chosen is moderately hard (¢B = 1
4D), the elec-
torate believes with certainty that the government will not give high
priority to the sector in the future. Whether the government is neutral
or contra-sector is viewed as equally likely by the electorate.
Given these beliefs, both a soft and a hard budget constraint is costly
for the incumbent government. In both cases, the electorate will recognize
them as ”extreme” in one or the other direction, and the probability of being
elected falls from 1=2 to 1=2 ¡ 1
16c,t h a ti s ,w i t h 1
16c units. Thus, the cost of
choosing a soft (or a hard) budget policy caused by a reduced probability of
re-election is ­
16c.4 The result says that if the budget de…cit is not too large,
the costs of reduced re-election probability dominates.
As explained earlier, the common explanation for soft budget constraints
is the existence of ex post e¢ciency gains from renegotiating the original
budget. However, these gains will not always be important. For example,
if the …nancial problem in the sector is due to increased internal slack, the
ex post e¢cient solution will perhaps be to change the management and the
internal governance instead of just making up the de…cit by infusing more
money. By de…nition (of slack) this will not hurt the quality of service.
The proposition above identi…es a political failure in that the handling of
the budget crisis does not respond to di¤erences in ex post costs of a hard
budget. In order not to scare away the median voter, the politicians end up
being medium soft, no matter what is the economic reality behind the de…cit.
3.2 A responsive budget constraint
The opposite of a non-responsive equilibrium would be a situation in which all
types of governments, solved the budget crisis in an ex post politically e¢cient
way. If a hard budget constraint were costly ex post (for example in terms of
reduced patient welfare), all types of governments would move in the direction
of soft budgets. A contra-sector party, however, would end up with a neutral
policy. From the above analysis it follows that such an equilibrium will only
exist if the political costs of moving away from the party’s intrinsically most
preferred response is su¢ciently large. When the size of the de…cit becomes
large, there is more at stake, and, hence, the costs of concealing its true
4Note that the government chooses B = B¤(1+e) if it is re-elected. Hence, the second
term of the second-period objective function disapears.
10political preferences become larger. Therefore, if the budget de…cit becomes
su¢ciently large, the government gives up acting strategically and instead
chooses to solve the budget crisis in an politically e¢cient way. The beliefs
of the electorate supporting a fully responsive equilibrium are identical to
the beliefs speci…ed in the non-responsive equilibrium.5 Using the analysis of
the non-responsive equilibrium (see appendix), we get the following result:




ernment solves the budget crisis in a politically e¢cient way, i.e. ¢B =
D(1 + e + g) 8 e and g.
Note that the electorate does not become fully informed in a responsive
equilibrium. Uncertainty about the costs of hard budget constraints (g)
makes the handling of the crisis politically overlapping.
The size e¤ect of the budget de…cit makes it interesting to see whether
we can identify an implicit too-big-to-fail policy in the political handling of a
budget de…cit. The only way of reaching a complete bail-out solution in this
model, is to confront the politicians with a su¢ciently large budget de…cit.
In this respect, one might say there is a too-big-to-fail policy. However, from
an ex ante point of view of the sector, the expected reaction to a de…cit
is independent of size. If they come up with a small budget de…cit, we
have shown that the government always responds by ¢B = D
2 .H o w e v e r ,
if the de…cit is su¢ciently large, the response is dependent on both party
preferences and the ex post costs of a hard budget. The gives an expected
policy E¢B = D
2 .H e n c e ,
Corollary 3 The expected degree of cost sharing ex post is independent of
the size of the budget de…cit.
4 Discussion
In the previous sections we have seen, within a very stylized model, how
political signalling (or actually more correct, a desire by the incumbent po-
litical party to avoid signalling) distorts their response to a budget de…cit







h a v ean o n - z e r op r o b a -
bility of being chosen in equilibrium.
11in a public sector. In order not to reveal its preferences for the electorate,
the government chooses a medium sized money infusion independently of
the economic environment. Although this is costly for the government, as
it sincerely wants the budget response to be in accordance with the type of
situation in the sector, the cost of allowing for a ‡exible policy rule in terms
of a reduced probability of re-election is even bigger. As a result, the govern-
ment’s budget response is not only ine¢cient from an ex ante point of view -
the response is inadequately designed from an ex post point of view as well.
It is important to note that this result is not driven by an assumption that
the government is populistic and only wants to stay in o¢ce. A populist gov-
ernment of this kind has no incentives other than doing whatever the median
voter prefers at any time, and as it has no political preferences of its own it
has nothing to signal. Our results actually hinge on our assumption that the
government is partisan and really wants to push through its preferred policy
after the election. This is why it is important for the electorate to know
the true preferences of the competing political parties and why signalling is
meaningful.
Admittedly, the model gives a stylized picture of political decision-making.
Still, we believe that the ‡avor of our results should go through more gener-
ally. If the electorate believes that the government’s preferences are not in
tune with its own, the government may want to signal its preferences. For
instance, it seems that the health care sector is a politically important sector
in many countries, and that voters often express discontent with the govern-
ments willingness to allocate resources to the sector. In this case, parties not
traditionally associated with public spending may have an incentive to go for
a soft policy to signal their new preferences. However, the desire to signal
may lead such a government to pursue a soft budget policy even if the situ-
ation actually calls for a hard budget policy. Furthermore, in order to signal
truthfully, the party may actually have to oversell its message by choosing
a policy that is even softer than the preferred policy for a pro-health-care
party. In any case, the ex post handling of budget crises becomes ine¢cient
as it is insensitive to the economic environment.
Finally, if the electorate’s preferences changes over time, the government,
in an e¤ort to show that it is still in line with the median voter, may budget
de…cits in a way that is erratic and inconsistent over time.
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13Appendix
C o n s i d e r… r s tt h ep a r t ya tt h ec e n t r e( e =0 ) . Suppose that history
behind the de…cit calls for a medium sized rescue operation ex post (g =0 ).
The intrinsically best policy for the party will then be ¢B = D
2 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,
since this also maximizes the probability of re-election, it will surely be the
preferred policy.
Suppose instead that the ex post costs of hard budget constraints move
the preferred policy away from the medium response. If g = ¡1
4,i nw h i c h
case the intrinsically best response, given neutral party preferences, is to be
moderately hard (¢B = 1
4D). The gain from choosing 1
4D instead of 1
2D in
terms of improved …rst period utility will be (1
4D)2. However, by following
this policy, the electorate will draw the conclusion that the government is
either neutral or contra-sector, and this reduces the probability of winning
the election. The expected policy by the government, if re-elected, is 7
8B¤.
Using (4), we see that the probability of winning the election is reduced by
1
32c. The associated cost of reduced probability of winning is given by ­
32c .
In order for the government (at the center) to choose a medium sized budget
response, (1
4D)2 < ­
32c: This holds true if D<
q
­
2c ´ D1: Note that exactly
t h es a m ea r g u m e n th o l d sw h e nt h eex post costs of a hard budgets calls for
a moderate soft budget constraint (i.e. g = 1
4).
Consider then a party whose preferences give low priority to the sector
experiencing a budget crisis (e = ¡1
4). Suppose …rst that the g = 1
4.T h e n
the optimal response, given the incumbent’s preferences, is a medium sized
budget response, ¢B = D
2 . Given this policy, the incumbent party also
maximizes its probability of re-election. The medium response, therefore,
maximizes the incumbent’s utility. However, if the ex post costs of a hard
budget constraint call for a hard or moderately hard budget constraint (g =
¡1
4 or g =0 ) things become more interesting. Suppose …rst that g = ¡1
4.
Given its intrinsic preferences, the government wants to stick to the orig-
inal budget (¢B =0 ) as the gain from this is (D
2 )2.H o w e v e r , i f i t d o e s
so, its disguise as a potentially moderate party will be destroyed, and the
electorate (correctly) infers that the current government will not give prior-
ity to the sector after the election. This reduces the probability of winning
the election, and the cost associated with this is 1




4c ´ D2; a government experiencing a de…cit in a low-priority sector
will choose to grant more money even when the ex post costs call for hard
14budget constraints.
I tr e m a i n st om a k es u r et h a tt h ei n c u m b e n t( w i t ht y p ee = ¡1
4 and g =
¡1
4) does not want deviate from the equilibrium response (D
2 ) to a moderately
hard budget (¢B = 1
4D) instead of a neutral response. This would bring the
party closer to its intrinsically preferred …rst-period policy, giving a bene…t of
the amount 3
16D2. The costs in terms of reduced probability of winning the
election is ­
32c: Hence, if D<
q
­
6c ´ D3; the government does not want to
deviate from a medium sized rescue operation to a moderately hard budget
constraint D
4 . Comparing the three di¤erent critical values of D, we …nd that
D3 <D 2 <D 1: Hence, proposition 1 follows.
15